Soeharto: The Life And Legacy Of Indonesia's Second President

By Barry Desker
Apr 14, 2007
The Straits Times

SOEHARTO relinquished the Indonesian Presidency on May 21, 1998 in the midst of the Asian financial and economic crisis and mayhem on the streets of major cities in Java, following demonstrations, riots, looting, especially of businesses owned by ethnic Chinese, and widely reported rapes in Jakarta.

In the years since then, there has been extensive media and scholarly coverage, within and outside Indonesia, of the legacy of gross violations of human rights, the lack of democracy, the abuse of his office by Soeharto's family and cronies for private gain, the endemic corruption of the Indonesian system and the over-centralisation of government under Soeharto.

Yet, the paradox is that whenever Soeharto has fallen seriously ill since he stepped down from office, a parade of the powerful and influential in Indonesia has immediately headed for his hospital suite and the man in the street is heard recalling the jaman mas (golden age) under him.

Does the image of Soeharto as evil and the memory of a negative legacy reflect current Indonesian sentiments? Is it a fair reflection of Soeharto the man, his performance as President of Indonesia for more than 30 years, and how he is remembered inside Indonesia, in the region as well as internationally?

Retnowati Abdulgani-Knapp challenges this assessment in an authorised biography of Soeharto subtitled 'The Life And Legacy Of Indonesia's Second President'.

Wati is the daughter of the late Roeslan Abdulgani, an old friend from the days when I was a diplomat in Jakarta. Roeslan Abdulgani was a memory bank of background information, always ready with an interesting story or recollection from his years in office. He was the secretary-general of the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1956 to 1957 and Minister of Information from 1962 to 1965 and confidant of President Sukarno.

Roeslan Abdulgani gained Soeharto's trust when Soeharto took office after the failed coup attempt of Oct 1, 1965 while still retaining his friendship with Sukarno and his family. He was appointed as Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations and later served as the key guru of Indonesia's doctrine of Pancasila or Five Principles, first articulated by Sukarno and promulgated by Soeharto as the national ideology. In writing this biography, Wati received direct access to Soeharto, his children, family and close associates.

Our attention is drawn to the private as well as the public Soeharto, the family man and the politician who was a dominant figure in domestic and regional affairs for over a generation. In an era when attention is drawn to the rise of religious intolerance, Soeharto is recalled by Wati as 'a good Muslim, but very tolerant of all faiths'.

Soeharto's Javanese heritage comes through clearly in the book, not just in his use of language but in his attitude and key reference points as well.

While other Third World states focused on import substitution and autarkic policies, Soeharto's support for the opening of the Indonesian economy and warm ties with the West set him apart from other post-colonial leaders in the 1970s.

Wati highlights Soeharto's personal interest in agriculture, a contrast with the urban, capital-centred perspective of many leaders of developing countries. He was most relaxed at his Tapos ranch or talking to farmers during his visits outside Jakarta.

The pragmatic strain in Soeharto also led him to skip meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) after he attended the Lusaka Summit in 1970 as he found the endless harangues on colonialism distasteful. His next summit was in Belgrade in 1989 at the end of the Cold War when he decided that Indonesia should seek the chairmanship of the NAM.

While Soeharto and his family are portrayed sympathetically, the biography does not shy away from assessing that the core of public discontent centred on the control by Soeharto's extended family and 50 other families of most of Indonesia's economic successes.

It also provides revealing insights into the foundations set up by Soeharto, which are the basis of claims that Soeharto is one of Asia's wealthiest men, and argues that it did distribute significant benefits such as building orphanages, mosques, hospitals and schools, but there was also an abuse of trust by those cronies who were responsible for these foundations. It is this abuse of trust by Soeharto's cronies and the misuse of their privileges by his children that undermined public support for Soeharto.

Like other observers friendly to the Soeharto family, Wati notes that the death of his wife Ibu Tien in 1996 resulted in a lack of sensitivity in the business dealings of his children as Soeharto was an over-protective father. Ibu Tien is also credited with a premonition that her husband should not seek re-election. However, my assessment is that until he was confronted with the defection of 14 Cabinet ministers on May 20, 1998, Soeharto did not act as if he intended to leave office.

Unfortunately, he failed to recognise that the world was changing around him. With the end of the Cold War, he was not indispensable and the Clinton administration did not intend to mollycoddle him.

IMF strictures made him appear weak and dependent while attempts to strike an independent path by reinstating postponed infrastructure projects favoured by his children and cronies only resulted in a loss of international confidence as the economic crisis worsened. Indonesia could not be insulated from external developments. The urban elite increasingly perceived Soeharto as a liability and student unrest was a theme of his last months in office.

His appointment of B.J. Habibie as vice-president in March 1998 indicated that he did not intend to step down as Soeharto was aware that most politically active Indonesians saw him as preferable to Habibie. Habibie was widely seen as mercurial, unpredictable and given to expensive showcase projects. However, up to that time, Habibie enjoyed a trusted personal relationship with Soeharto. In a telling commentary, which reflects the hours spent interviewing Soeharto, Wati observed, 'things changed completely after B.J. Habibie became president. It was under B.J. Habibie's rule that Pak Harto was dragged to court. It was under B.J. Habibie's government that Indonesia gave up East Timor. It was during B.J. Habibie's reign that donations to his charitable foundations were discontinued...Pak Harto felt betrayed and he has never forgiven B.J. Habibie. Every approach by the latter to see him has been incessantly rebuffed'.

For the student of contemporary Indonesia, one of the most useful aspects of this biography is the insight into Soeharto's personality. Wati noted that once Soeharto 'comes to know and trust someone, he emerges as an open and warm person. Pak Harto would never hesitate to come to a decision once he had made up his mind, even if it would be an unpopular one'. This is a striking and valid observation. It is the key to understanding the confidence that Soeharto enjoyed in his dealings with other leaders in the region and beyond. His word was his commitment.

In his dealings with Singapore, Soeharto enjoyed credibility because he upheld agreements that he made. The first experience of this was when he sent a message in his early years of office seeking 10,000 tonnes of rice to meet emergency needs because of the failure of the rice crop. He promised to repay in kind in due course. But the price of rice rose on international markets and Singapore's leaders wrote off this loan as a bad judgment. Indonesia repaid the rice on schedule and provided rice of better quality than that which was given. Singapore's leaders concluded that he was a man who could be trusted.

It was an experience repeated at various times during his tenure of office. In 1978, when there was an attempt to bypass Singapore on the kangaroo route between the United Kingdom and Australia under Australia's newly proclaimed integrated civil aviation policy, which cut access to Singapore while providing inducements to Indonesia and other countries in the region, Soeharto took the firm view that Asean should not succumb to such tactics.

Similarly, in 1990, when Singapore offered the use of facilities in Singapore to American military aircraft and naval vessels as a contribution to the continued US presence in South-east Asia following the return of Clark airfield and Subic naval base to the Philippines, Soeharto's public acceptance of this move quelled criticism from the region.

While Soeharto did not throw his weight around within Asean, he was the most influential leader within Asean. He earned respect because he was consistent and provided space for each Asean state to develop in its own way. In this, he practised the Javanese dictum, mikul dhuwur, mendhem jero (to look for the best in others and to forgive the trespasses of those whom we respect).

As we enter the 10th year after the fall of Soeharto, the time is ripe for a re-assessment of his contribution. This authorised biography by Wati Roeslan-Knapp provides us with insights from Soeharto's perspective, even as it stimulates other questions about his legacy.

Barry Desker, head of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, is a former Singapore ambassador to Jakarta.

Soeharto: The Life And Legacy Of Indonesia's Second President was launched at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies on Thursday.

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