Singapore project overseers, with the years of SEZ experience in several Asian countries, may not find these difficulties insurmountable. The focus on the Singapore tourism dimension would enable them to tap into software the public sector, especially the Singapore Tourism Board, has compiled over decades. They would be in a position to suggest not only how, but also what to offer, to promote the centre as a tourist attraction within as well as beyond Russia. The lack of familiarity may initially discourage foreign companies, including those from Singapore, from investing in this and other Russian SEZ projects. However, if the Russian Federation's regional governments give their officials full support to execute policy and the infrastructure plan, this would help draw investments. A Singapore role carries cachet. Often this is enough for an SEZ to attract private-sector participation. In any case, energy-rich Russia is not short of funding. Its affluence and exposure to outside influences have increased domestic tourism demand, although a mini Singapore would have to compete with European and Asian destinations on price and cultural lure.

Despite all the positive factors, Singapore places its brand on the line once it agrees to take on the Russian proposal. Host government transparency and contractual discipline in setting up and running the zone must match the SEZ enthusiasm in a Russia where dozens of these proposals await approval. It should be more than a Potemkin village. Singapore cannot make Merlion swim and spout its magic in a remote part of continental Russia if its collaborators' commitment falls short of the standards it has set for itself and with which it benchmarks consultancy work abroad.