THERE is no reason to treat as a breakthrough the first instalment of North Korea's nuclear accounting given last week. It was in the nature of a preamble on its weapons-making capability. The real meat of the notification process - the number of bombs it possesses and how much enriched uranium it supposedly has - will certainly have to be negotiated afresh when the six nations of the Beijing forum resume discussions. It is reported they could be meeting within a week. The momentum is being kept up, a positive sign. At any rate, the United States government's reciprocal acts of eliminating some commercial sanctions and the preliminary procedural step of delisting North Korea as a terrorism source are revocable, if the verification that is to follow is inconclusive. But neither is the week's development to be regarded as a sellout to assumed Korean perfidy, the stand of those opposed to any form of accommodation. President George W. Bush's cold-war merchants within his administration and hawkish ex-advisers now inhabiting Washington policy institutes have done violence to the concept of realpolitik with their advocacy of force to settle foreign policy challenges. It is to Mr Bush's credit that he accepts, late in his tenure though that the conversion has come, that patient diplomacy is the better course.
Whatever the degree of consternation expressed by naysayers, it is just so much noise that does not alter the basic premise of the issue. This quid pro quo is the only means by which North Korea could reasonably be made to renounce its nuclear ambitions. Its national security goals will be achieved only if it has normal relations with the US - aside from Japan - and a formal end to the Korean War is declared. Much has been said about the material aid it will extract but this is essentially a business cost in securing a contract. Mr Kim Jong Il is months away from seeing out the second American president who has made North Korea a foreign policy issue. He has staying power, a factor critics have consistently failed to take into account. What is encouraging about the deal being readied is that the incentives of eventual diplomatic ties with the US and the flow of aid, trade and loans act as a block against duplicitous conduct by Pyongyang. The nuclear declaration has been only a necessary step in the long and still uncertain process of removing the North Korean threat. Blowing up the inoperative cooling tower at the Yongbyon reactor to go with the nuclear declaration was in a way theatrical, but it is more helpful to read it as serious intent by Pyongyang to get the process moving.